MI5 alerts Parliament to LinkedIn spy ploys; UK acts

Open LinkedIn at lunchtime and a friendly recruiter offers a short project on “insider insights”. Today that exact scenario moved from classroom case study to real-world risk. On Tuesday 18 November 2025, MI5 warned MPs, peers and staff about suspected Chinese intelligence activity on professional networks, and the Speaker shared the alert across Parliament. Security minister Dan Jarvis told the Commons the government would not tolerate covert interference and outlined new steps. BBC News and ITV News reported the alert and the minister’s statement in Parliament.

The alert named two LinkedIn accounts said to be used on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security: Amanda Qiu, linked to BR-YR Executive Search, and Shirly Shen, linked to Internship Union. According to the Speaker’s message, these profiles contacted people at scale while posing as recruiters for paid ‘consultancy’ or similar roles. MI5 said the approaches may include offers of expenses‑paid trips and even crypto payments to draw out non‑public information.

Jarvis told MPs the net is wider than just politicians. Parliamentary staff, think‑tank researchers, economists, geopolitical consultants and officials have been targeted because of their networks and access. He also cautioned that small snippets can be valuable when pieced together, so what feels trivial to you might be useful to an intelligence service.

Ministers announced a £170m upgrade to encrypted technology used for official business, alongside what officials are calling a counter political interference and espionage action plan. That includes tighter rules on covert political funding, stronger enforcement powers for the Electoral Commission, tailored briefings for parties and devolved governments by year‑end, and fresh guidance for all candidates ahead of May’s elections.

There was diplomatic pushback. China’s UK embassy rejected the claims as “pure fabrication” and accused Britain of a “self‑staged charade”. Jarvis also noted China remains the UK’s third‑largest trading partner, even as he said sanctions would be used if necessary. We can hold two truths at once: trade continues, and counter‑espionage needs to be robust.

Context helps here. The Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS) began on 1 July 2025 with an enhanced tier that currently covers Iran and Russia. Jarvis said ministers are looking closely at whether to add more states but no decision has been made. For teachers and students, this is a live example of transparency rules meeting fast‑moving influence tactics.

So what should you do if a recruiter slides into your inbox? Treat any request for privileged or non‑public information as a red flag, especially if money, travel or hush is involved. Look up the firm using independent sources, ask for an official email, and check whether the role exists on a verifiable site. If you work in a school, university or public body, save screenshots and escalate through your safeguarding or security lead rather than replying in the moment.

MI5’s National Protective Security Authority published practical guidance in October reminding anyone in politics to trust their instincts, keep simple records of odd approaches and report them early. Even if you’re outside Westminster-say you’re an undergraduate on a think‑tank internship-the same habits protect you and the people you work with.

Let’s keep our language precise. This story concerns a state’s intelligence activity, not Chinese communities in Britain or Chinese students on our campuses. Prejudice makes people less likely to speak up. We focus on behaviours-secret asks, payment for ‘insider’ access, evasive identities-not on ethnicity or nationality.

Why this alert lands so sharply now: in September a high‑profile prosecution of two men accused of spying for China was dropped. The Crown Prosecution Service said it could not proceed without government evidence that, at the time of the alleged offences, China constituted a national security threat; ministers dispute that characterisation and have published some witness statements. The episode has fuelled calls for clearer rules and consistent public messaging.

This is also part of a longer pattern. In January 2022, MI5 issued an interference alert naming Christine Lee, a London‑based lawyer; a tribunal later upheld MI5’s decision to issue that alert. Intelligence leaders have repeatedly warned about state‑linked data collection and cyber activity aimed at UK institutions.

If you teach politics, citizenship or computing, this is a ready‑made lesson. Students can scrutinise a ‘recruiter’ profile and list claims they can verify, draft a polite refusal to an inappropriate request, and map reporting routes in their organisation. And for all of us on LinkedIn: if a message trades money for privileged access or asks you to keep things secret from your employer, that isn’t normal hiring. Say you can’t share non‑public information, move the conversation to official channels, and report the approach.