Leaked US-Russia plan: Donbas handover, 600k limit

You may have seen the leaked 28‑point draft said to outline a US‑Russia path to end the war in Ukraine. The headline claims are stark: areas of Donbas still under Ukrainian control would shift to Russia’s de facto control, and Ukraine’s armed forces would be capped at 600,000 personnel. We’re going to walk through what the draft says, what the key terms mean, and where experts see red lines, drawing on reporting from BBC News and public statements by officials.

First, treat this as a draft, not a treaty. Even supporters call it “a list of potential ideas”. According to BBC reporting, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio used that wording, while Germany’s foreign minister Johann Wadephul has said the 28 points should not be read as a definitive plan after speaking with US envoy Steve Witkoff. The European Union and Russia’s foreign ministry have both said they have not officially seen the document. Timelines are also fluid, though reports suggest pressure for decisions by US Thanksgiving on Thursday 27 November 2025.

What the text promises Ukraine is simultaneously broad and vague. It speaks of confirming Ukraine’s sovereignty, a comprehensive non‑aggression agreement among Russia, Ukraine and Europe, and ‘robust’ security guarantees for Kyiv. It even floats snap national elections within 100 days of a deal, something currently impossible under martial law but theoretically possible if hostilities stop. If Russia invades again, the draft points to a co‑ordinated military response, the return of sanctions, and the collapse of the agreement.

Words to know: de facto recognition versus de jure recognition. De facto recognition means acknowledging who actually controls a territory in practice without legally recognising that control. De jure recognition means granting lawful, formal recognition under international law. The draft’s most controversial line would see Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States, stopping short of legal recognition. That phrasing is designed to avoid clashing with Ukraine’s constitution, which states its borders are indivisible and inviolable.

Another key term to understand is NATO’s Article 5. Article 5 is the alliance promise that an attack on one member is an attack on all, triggering collective defence. The draft’s ‘security guarantees’ for Ukraine do not specify who provides them or how they would work, and they sit well short of an Article 5‑style pledge. For any Ukrainian government, a vague guarantee would be far weaker than a NATO treaty commitment.

Territory is the biggest flashpoint. The draft says Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the part of Donetsk they still hold, creating a neutral demilitarised buffer zone internationally recognised as belonging to the Russian Federation, with Russian troops staying out of that strip. That zone includes the ‘fortress belt’ cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka, where at least a quarter of a million people live. Given Russia has spent more than a year trying to seize Pokrovsk, Ukraine is unlikely to hand over these strategic hubs without a fight.

The military cap is the other big ask. Ukraine’s armed forces were estimated at roughly 880,000 active personnel last January, up from about 250,000 before the full‑scale invasion in February 2022. Cutting to 600,000 might sound like a peacetime ceiling, but it intrudes on Ukraine’s sovereign right to organise its defence-and could still be a number Moscow dislikes. As Ukraine’s UN representative Khrystyna Hayovyshyn has argued, Kyiv rejects any limits on its right to self‑defence, on force size, or on capabilities.

On alliances, the draft would lock Ukraine out of NATO by embedding neutrality in Ukraine’s constitution and adding a new NATO‑level rule that Ukraine will not be admitted in future. It then offers a partial sweetener on Europe: Ukraine would be eligible for EU membership and receive short‑term, preferred access to EU markets while that is considered. BBC reporting notes that Ukraine’s current constitution already sets a path to both NATO and the EU, and Hayovyshyn has called any constraint on Ukraine’s alliance choices a red line.

The proposed security architecture goes further. NATO would agree not to station troops in Ukraine, while European fighter jets would be deployed in Poland. Ukraine would commit to remaining non‑nuclear. That reads as a pushback on Western ideas, led by the UK and France, for a ‘coalition of the willing’ to help police any future agreement on the ground.

Sanctions and Russia’s international standing are threaded through the leak. Several points seek to bring Russia back in from isolation-reintegrating its economy and inviting it back into the G8. That is hard to reconcile with today’s reality: Russia was ejected from the G7 after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and President Vladimir Putin remains under an International Criminal Court arrest warrant. If G7 states resisted readmission before the 2022 invasion, they are even less likely to agree now.

Money is a separate pillar. The draft suggests investing $100bn of frozen Russian assets into US‑led reconstruction in Ukraine, with the United States receiving 50% of the profits and Europe adding another $100bn. Earlier estimates this year put Ukraine’s reconstruction bill at around $524bn (€506bn), far above those sums. About €200bn in frozen Russian assets sits at Euroclear in Belgium, and EU leaders are working on a plan to use proceeds to support Kyiv. Under the draft, the rest would flow into a US‑Russian investment vehicle, meaning some Russian funds would return while also generating returns for US partners. Critics note this risks leaving the EU with large bills but limited upside.

Weapons policy in the draft is uneven. It does not cap Ukraine’s arms industry or its long‑range strike capabilities, which now include home‑grown systems such as Flamingo and Long Neptune, according to open reporting. Yet it adds a trip‑wire: if Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St Petersburg, the security guarantee would be void. That clause sits awkwardly with the absence of broader weapons restrictions.

There are nods to governance and rights. One point says both countries would abolish discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian‑ and Russian‑language media and education. Another proposes splitting electricity from the Russian‑occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant-Europe’s largest-equally between Russia and Ukraine. In southern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, front lines would be frozen, with Russia relinquishing areas it holds elsewhere, though how any of that would mesh with Russia’s own annexation claims is unclear.

Politics around the plan remain opaque. Russian special envoy Kirill Dmitriev reportedly spent up to three days with US envoy Steve Witkoff discussing the draft, which has fuelled suspicion of a stitch‑up in Moscow’s favour. Yet Russia has been cautious in public and says it has not seen the text. Meanwhile, the proposal to lift sanctions ‘in stages’ and ‘case‑by‑case’ is likely too slow for the Kremlin, while a ‘full amnesty’ for all parties would play badly in Kyiv and many European capitals.

How to read a leak like this in class or at home. Scan for language that hides decision‑making power-words such as ‘robust’, ‘neutral’, and ‘comprehensive’ sound reassuring but only matter if the who, how, and when are spelled out. Ask who gains in the short term. Territory handovers and a permanent NATO bar tilt towards Russia’s goals; the vagueness on security guarantees is hard for Ukraine to accept; and the front‑line freeze in the south could still be difficult for the Kremlin given it claims to have annexed those regions. The key civic questions are about consent, sovereignty, and enforcement.

Finally, the timeline. Reports point to an ‘aggressive’ push to secure answers by US Thanksgiving on Thursday 27 November 2025. But even the leak has shifted over the past 24 hours, with some details appearing in US media on Thursday and then dropping out of later versions. Until governments publish a formal text, we should treat the 28 points as a moving draft rather than a done deal, keep checking primary statements, and teach our readers how to spot what is specific and what is simply wishful wording.